Population

by John Jowett

The message was, in every sense, written large - BEWARE OF CHILDREN. The State decreed that pregnancies were to be rationed in strict rotation. This year Chang and Cheng, next year Li and Liu, the following year Wang and Wong. Giving birth in turn, was the acknowledged slogan. The birth quota was fixed at a maximum of one child per married couple. Noticeboards in state enterprises monitored the menstrual cycles of all the female workers. The nationwide surveillance system sought explanations from any woman who missed a period. Family planning cadres, in pursuit of promotion and their annual bonus, reported all the required information. Pregnancies outside the plan would be terminated by abortion. In the euphemistic language of officialdom, the State would take 'remedial action' against unwanted pregnancies. The poor quality of state produced contraceptives meant that remedial actions are constantly required. Annual abortions, notoriously under-reported, rose to 14.4 million. Unwanted preg nancies were defined by the State, not by the wishes of individual couples. The guiding principle appeared to be that society is infinitely malleable. Social engineering will succeed.

Was this the science fiction of George Orwell or John Wyndham? It was neither. It was fact not fiction. It was China in the 1980s... or was it? One child per couple: fact or fiction?

Over the past 40 years the Chinese authorities have gradually switched from Mao's optimistic view of people as producers, to the current pessimistic view of people as consumers; a switch from a positive 'hands to work', to a negative 'mouths to feed' philosophy. An enemy greater than the USA or USSR, a problem more pervasive than poverty and pollution, such is the leadership's perception of its population.

By the 1980s the government had convinced itself that the problems of feeding, clothing, housing, educating and employing the population were all to be traced to a common cause - too many people. The solution therefore appeared obvious - produce fewer people. In pursuit of that belief came the single-child policy, aimed at reducing not only the growth rate, but eventually the size of China's population. If one child replaces two parents then China's population must eventually go into decline. Chinese calculations put the optimum carrying capacity at around 750 million, rather than the current population of 1100 million.

In an endeavor to persuade the present generation to conform to the one-child policy, the country adopted a system of economic rewards and penalties. The basic offer to parents was a 5-10 per cent salary bonus for limiting their families to one child and a 10 per cent salary deduction for those who produced two or more. The economic sanctions would operate throughout the first 14-16 years of the child's life. In addition to their salary bonus, parents who signed a one-child pledge and receive the 'planned parenthood glory certificate', gained preferential treatment in terms of access to such scarce commodities as food, housing and health care; while the single child was to receive priority in access to education and employment. But, as always, social pressure has been far more important than economic sanctions in enforcing government directives. New solutions generate new problems

The engineering of new solutions often generates new problems and there is no doubt that a series of problems could arise from a nation-wide one-child policy. Let's examine the roster of possible problems, all the while keeping in mind the peculiar truth, that China has no national one-child policy. A major long-term problem concerns the aging of the population. Currently less than 5 per cent of China's population are over 65 years but the pursuit of a one-child policy, even if only partially successful, would totally transform the age structure and in so doing produce a declining work force and eventually a very aged population. By the 2030s the over 65s could constitute more than 25 percent of China's pqpulation and thus within a lifetime the elderly would have increased from 1 in 20 to 1 in 4. If China persists with its present retirement police of age 55 for women, and 60 for men, the proportion of retired people in the 2030s would be very large indeed. In the absence of either family support - children - and/or state support - pension schemes - who would care for the elderly?

Resistance to restrictive family planning poilicies has been greatest in the rural areas.

Chinese parents have traditionally relied on their children, especially sons, as the best strategy for old age security. In developing countries one of the motivations for high fertility is that children are seen as an essential investment for old age, someone to look after you when you can no longer look after yourself. In a one-child society there would be too many dependent old and too few working young to fulfill these social obligations. Parents whose only child is a daughter see themselves as particularly at risk, for once married the daughter moves away and joins her husband's family. Some form of institutional security for old age is urgently needed. Unfortunately, a state pension is available to only 10- 15 per cent of the work force, being restricted in the main to the employees of urban based, state enterprises. In rural areas less than 1 percent of the retired personnel receive a pension from the collective welfare fund. The funding of social security for China's elderly will be a colossal undertaking.

The clash between the traditional preference for sons and the current one-child policy unwittingly precipitated a resurgence of female infanticide. The despairing hope of couples was that their second pregnancy would produce a son. Such acts of despair were extensively documented in the Chinese press in the early 1980s. Zhao Ziyang, in his report on the sixth five-year plan, stressed that the whole country should condemn the criminal activity of female infanticide. Official recognition of the problem is to be found in Article 28 of the province of Sichuan's family planning regulations which notes that the 'drowning, abandoning, selling and maltreatment of baby girls is prohibited'. Article 16 of Shaanxi province's regulations stipulates that the sexual identification of a foetus is prohibited, thereby pre-empting the selective abortion of females.

Balancing individual needs and government objectives is no less of a problem in China than in any other country.

It remains to be seen whether excessive attention by doting parents on their one and only child will produce a generation of selfish, uncooperative and socially maladjusted children. There has been much talk about the 'spoilt brat syndrome' and the Chinese have coined the pejorative expression, 'little emperor', to describe the over-indulged single child.

Not one, but many, child policies

These concerns might well be justified if China was pursuing a national one-child policy. But it isn't. One- child policies do exist, as do one-son policies, two-child policies, three-child policies and occasionally no family planning policies whatsover. In reality there is no all- embracing national policy but instead a series of regional policies which vary not only between provinces but also within provinces. Given China's current level of socio- economic development, rural couples need more children. Urban couples want more children. In the absence of a national one-child policy, an end of the century population of around 1300 million, some 100 million greater than predicted, appears likely.

Looking back over the past decade one finds that none of the targets established for the single-child policy have been achieved and in most cases the shortfall is dramatic. Natural rates of population increase for 1981 and 1985 were 14.55 and 11.23 per 1000 population against the targeted figures of 8 and 5 per 1000. The proportion of first births which was expected to rise above 90 per cent for the country as a whole, accounted for only half the births in 1907. Third and later births which were to be eliminated by 1985 still accounted for 20 per cent of that year's births.

In the less developed interior provinces of Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia, Yunnan, and Guizhou around half the births were third or later and almost a quarter of the babies in these provinces were born into families which already had four or more children. A family planning official in Gansu weighed up his words. "While a three- child policy is not 'permitted' it is 'allowed', especially if the first two children are girls".

Resistance to restrictive family planning policies has been greatest in the rural areas and roughly three- quarters of China's population live in the countryside and work in agriculture. The conflict between the desire of individuals for more children and the governments directive for smaller, single-child families has generated a good deal of defiance and deception. In many areas policies have been relaxed to accommodate the needs and wishes of the people. The preference for sons rather than daughters has precipitated the widespread adoption of one-son rather than one-child policies. Where local policies are perceived as being too harsh, resistance is registered in the illegal removal of intra-uterine devices (China's most widely used contraceptive) and the threats and physical violence visited on family planning workers.

Often the conflict over desired family size is resolved by 'massaging' the data. The local population have the number of births they wish. Births in excess of the quota are simply not registered. On paper at least the government's family planning targets are being achieved. The government publishes the 'doctored' data and outside observers become entangled in a web of misinformation. In 1981 the national census revealed that 3.25 million births went unrecorded. The Chinese press recently highlighted the problem of 'black' children ('black' meaning illegal, as in 'black' market), unregis- tered either because their parents wanted to avoid the financial penalties or because the local authority refused their registration because it would adversely affect the local birth plan. Unregistered children find it especially difficult to gain access to state food, education and employment.

In Guizhou Province "there have been successive cases of hampering and sabotaging family planning work in various parts of the province." Family planning personnel have been threatened, beaten up and had violent revenge taken against them for implementing family planning policies. Similar problems must have been encountered in Sichuan for Article 27 of the provincial family planning regulations is concerned with those who insult, threaten, and beat doctors, nurses and other personnel in charge of family planning work". Article 28 details the fines and punishments imposed against those who illegally remove IUDs. On Hainan Island it was found necessary to "strictly forbid the making of excuses, forging certificates, pretending to have received tubal ligation and illegally removing IUDs."

Attempts to control the growth of population are currently being undermined by the move towards earlier marriage and earlier childbearing. The minimum legal age of marriage is 20 for women and 22 for men. Illegal marriages have become a worrying problem throughout China. A national conference held in February 1988 heard that 15-20 percent of all marriages currently taking place in rural China violated the legal provision on the age of marriage. In some areas the proportion reached 30- 40 percent. Many lived together as husband and wife without completing the necessary registration of theirmarriage. Problems of arranged marriages, mercen- ary marriages and child betrothals were also discussed. Mercenary marriages in which young women are sold as wives, are a noticeable feature in Anhui Province.

A survey of the marriage registers of Vunnan showed that almost 800,000 couples had contracted unregistered marriages over the period 1980-87. Most of these consisted of early marriages, bigamy and unregistered cohabiting. There was one case of a 'marriage' between 8 year olds.

Throughout the 1980s the perceived needs of individ- ual families with regard to the optimum age of marriage and level of fertility have proved far more resistant to change than was anticipated by the government when it launched its one-child policy a decade ago. Current family sizes are smaller than the rural population desire but larger than the government predicted. Balancing individual needs and government objectives is no less of a problem in China than in any other country. It is often assumed that the Chinese government can command the power, authority and resources to impose on the country their particular choice of population policy. Yet many sections of China's population are currently finding it both desirable and possible to by- pass government imposed family planning regulations. Families in China, as elsewhere, are motivated by traditional strategies of self interest. Throughout the 1980s the best interests of most rural couples (more children) have run counter to the wishes of central government (fewer children). In time the new economic reforms, by increasing the pace of social and economic development, may generate a desire for fewer children and thereby narrow the gap between goals of the policymakers and the wishes of the people. But that time has not yet arrived.

The defiance of the one-child policy is, in part, linked to the major shift in social values which is currently taking place in China. Demands for greater freedom and human rights were most spectacularly seen in the student demonstrations in the Spring of 1989. Exercising the right to have the number of children they desire has brought many families into direct conflict with the government's family planning policies. In marked contrast to the outcome in Tiananmen Square, the conflict over desired family sizes has generally been resolved in favor of individual wishes rather than government objectives. Tanks, guns and armored vehicles are hardly the best ammunition for controlling patterns of sexual behavior and changing attitudes with regard to optimum family size. In any case the revolt over family size has been nationwide rather than limited to a 'few counter- revolutionaries in Beijing'.

Given the labor needs, the low levels of social and economic development and, above all, the lack of rural pension schemes, it would be presumptuous of govern- ment or anyone else to believe that poor people in rural China were not behaving rationally in their desire to have more than one child and at least one son. Little wonder that local populations, with or without the connivance of family planning cadres, are bending the rules to permit a second child and in some cases even a third child.

But not everyone avoids the damage. Hopelessly inefficient contraceptives generate excessively protective patterns of sexual behavior: A young woman on the pill, fitted with an IUD, making love to her condom-clad husband. At this distance it may raise a smile but with abortion looming large it is deadly serious. That sobbing, sobbing refrain, "oh god not another, not another, not another abortion", disturbs the mask of inscrutability and exposes the emotional and physical scars inflicted by those unwanted abortions.

The one-child policy always faced a major contradic- tion. It represented an attempt to increase central government control and to severely restrict people's freedom of choice in determining the size of their family. Yet elsewhere in society, the post-Mao reforms were offering a relaxation of state controls and families were being offered increased freedom of choice in planning their economic future.

Sooner or later the government will have to come to terms with the inevitable reality that family planning targets and policies must reflect the degree of possible acceptance by the majority of the population. The current reality is that more than 90 per cent of the rural population desire two or more children and only about half the urban population wish to conform to the one- child norm. The latter may be a very optimistic view of the desired family size in urban China. In a recent sample survey only 19.9 percent of the married women in Beijing wanted one child, 65.9 percent wanted two and 13.8 percent wanted three or more. While much has been achieved in lowering fertility there appears to be a limit, even in China, on the government's ability to engineer the timing, the pace and the extent of the decline in fertility.

Perhaps, as is so often the case with interpretations of Chinese policy, it all comes down to a question of semantics. The problem is neither new nor unique to China. "When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less." "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean different things." Providing one accepts that when the Chinese talk about a one-child policy it is sufficiently flexible to permit one, two, three, four or any number of children, then a national one-child policy may well exist. But with so flexible a policy, who knows what the total population might be in the year 2000.

Highlights of the One Child Policy

ANHUI PROVINCE (1979 & 1984)

Incentives

1. Medical benefits. (a) In urban areas (state workers or collective enterprise workers) monthly health expenses are paid until the only child reaches 14 years - for a son 5 yuan per month; for a daughter 6 yuan per month.

(b) In rural areas monthly supplementary work- points are awarded as health expenses until the child reaches 14 years of age - for a son 30 workpoints per month; for a daughter 40 workpoints per month.

(c) Priority in medical treatment and hospitali- zation for the only-child.

2. Housing benefit Priority in housing allocation for one-child families with space allocation equivalent to a two-child family.

3. Food benefit The only child receives an adult's grain ration.

4. Educational benefit The one-child has priority in terms of admission to nursery and kindergarten education.

5. Employment benefit Priority in labor recruitment given to households with one child.

6. Retirement benefit. State cadres, staff and workers, upon retirement, receive an additional 5% of their wages as pension.

7. Paid maternity leave. For a woman who has her first child late (after the age of 24), leave is extended by 20 days.

8. Sterilization incentives. Economic and other rewards for couples undergoing sterilizations and for medical personnel performing sterilizations.

9. Where health is a problem. Parents may have another child and receive the above benefits if the first child dies or is seriously crippled.

Disincentives

1. Return of benefits Couples who have a second child after being rewarded for only having one, must return all the benefits so far received.

2. Income deductions - during pregnancy.

(a) Women whose pregnancy is not covered by the plan should be convinced and mobilized to abort or to miscarry. Those who refuse this advice are subject to the following penalties: -

(b) In urban areas (cadres, staff and workers of the state) starting from the moqth of pregnancy 15% of the monthly wages of both husband and wife will be deducted in the case of a second child and 20% in the case of a third child. The money will be returned in full if the mother agrees to abort or miscarry.

(c) In rural areas appropriate economic sanctions will be applied.

3. Income deductions - after the birth.

(a) If cadres, staff and workers give birth to a second child, not covered by the plan, 10% of the monthly wages of both husband and wife will be deducted, as a social nurturing fee, for 7 years. In the case of a third child the deduction will be 15% for 14 years.

(b) For peasants (and urban residents not covered in 3a) the deduction for a second child not covered by the plan will be 10% of the total annual income of both husband and wife for a period of 7 years. In the case of a third child 15% for 14 years.

4. Employment. Cadres, staff and workers are not eligible for wage increases or bonuses (except for bonuses for overfullfilment of a production target or for an invention) if they give birth to a child not covered by the plan. Also they will not be commended as model workers or promoted.

S. Medical costs. Cadres, staff and workers who give birth to a child not covered by the plan will pay all medical expenses of confinement and the child will not be eligible to participate in publicly funded medical schemes. They are also not entitled to maternity leave.

6. Food costs. Grain for a third or subsequent child can only be obtained at higher prices until the child is 14 years old.

7. Hardship and living allowances.

(a) No subsidies will be paid for any hardship arising from having extra children.

(b) No ration coupons will be issued to third or additional children before the age of 14 for commodities or subsidiary foodstuffs (except cloth coupons).

8. Housing cost No extra housing space (urban) or housing lots (rural) will be allocated to accom modate additional children.

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